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A comparison of auctions and multilateral
negotiations
Charles J. Thomas*
and
Bart J. Wilson**

We compare first-price auctions to an exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations."
In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers
with privately known costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price
concessions. Using the experimental method, we find that with four sellers, transaction prices
are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions, but with two sellers, prices are higher
in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions. The institutions are equally efficient with
two sellers, but multilateral negotiations are slightly more efficient with four sellers.

1. Introduction
*
In this article we use the experimental method to study an exchange process that combines
features from auctions and bilateral bargaining. Specifically, we study a setting in which a buyer
solicits price offers from sellers and then confronts each seller with claims about his rivals' price
offers to elicit a more favorable offer. The buyer plays the sellers off one another until he either
accepts one of the offers or breaks off the negotiations. This process is pervasive in industrial
procurement, with buyers extending formal requests for proposal (RFPs) and then haggling with
suppliers after receiving the initial offers. It is also common to many other transactions, including
the securing of job offers and the purchasing of computers, contractors' services, and automobiles.
We refer to this exchange institution as "multilateral negotiation" to distinguish it from multilateral
bargaining, in which more than two agents bargain over the division of common surplus (see
Krishna and Serrano, 1996). We are interested in such issues as the efficiency of multilateral
negotiations, the effect of the number of sellers on the transaction price, and the effect of the
agents' and the institution's characteristics on the agents' bargaining positions.
*
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We are also interested in the relationship between the outcomes of multilateral negotiations
and various auction formats, for two reasons. First, this relationship has important implications for
institutional design. The fact that some buyers in an industry use multilateral negotiations, while
others use one-shot sealed-bid auctions, suggests either that the processes are outcome-equivalent
or that there are factors that make one process preferable to the other. Concerns about institutional
design are particularly important in the emerging e-commerce field, where buyers and sellers are
developing software agents to handle the procurement process online. For example, Su, Huang,
and Hammer (2000) have implemented a prototype server for automated, Web-based negotiations between buyers and sellers. Other researchers and practitioners in computer science and
management information systems are creating artificially intelligent mechanisms for negotiations
and auctions, but there is no empirical and little theoretical economic research comparing these
institutions to guide their work. This article provides a first step in such a research agenda.
Second, the relationship between the outcomes of multilateral negotiations and auctions has
important implications for antitrust analysis. Recently, U.S. competition authorities and private
parties have used auction models to evaluate the impact of proposed mergers. Even if transactions resemble multilateral negotiations, an analyst might use auction models to evaluate market
behavior because such models have been extensively studied, while there are no formal multilateral negotiation models. If the outcomes of auctions and multilateral negotiations are similar,
then there should be less concern about using a modelling approach that does not precisely fit
the market's institutional characteristics. Otherwise, caution should be used in applying auction
models when transactions more closely resemble multilateral negotiations.
We study the relationship between first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations by permitting fairly unstructured negotiation between a buyer and several sellers. Each experimental
session anonymously matches a buyer with either two or four sellers, and consists of several
periods of negotiations and first-price auctions. In the multilateral negotiations, the buyer can
communicate electronically in real time with the sellers, but the sellers cannot communicate with
each other.2 In the auctions, the buyer plays a passive role, and none of the players can communicate with each other. We match sellers' costs across groups and institutions to study whether
outcomes depend on which institution is used. Similarly, we vary the number of sellers to see
how the outcomes change within an institution.
We find that the number of sellers has an economically significant effect on the relationship
between first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations. With two sellers who have no prior
experience with either institution, transaction prices in multilateral negotiations are significantly
higher than transaction prices in first-price auctions. With four sellers, however, we cannot distinguish between the transaction prices. In fact, with four sellers we cannot distinguish between
the institutions' prices at any point in the experiment.
We also find a sequencing effect in the two-seller treatment. First, sellers first exposed to
multilateral negotiations set higher prices in first-price auctions than do sellers first exposed to
first-price auctions. Second, those 'sellers first exposed to multilateral negotiations subsequently
set higher prices in first-price auctions than the other sellers set in multilateral negotiations, in
contrast to our findings in the initial institutional regime. We attribute these results to the influence
of institutional experience, though there are alternative explanations.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the existing theory most relevant to
multilateral negotiations and explains the basis for our hypothesis that the outcomes of first-price
auctions and multilateral negotiations will be similar. Section 3 describes the experimental design
and procedures. Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes.

2. Related theoretical background
*
The exchange mechanism we study has not been formally modelled in the bargaining literature, presumably due to its strategic complexity. Hence, our analysis is driven by our intuition
1 For example, auction results were used to evaluate the recent merger between Rite-Aid and Revco (Baker, 1997).
2

The Appendix contains selections from the communication transcripts.

( RAND 2002.
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about how first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations should be related. To begin, we describe first-price auction theory and our conception of how multilateral negotiations are executed.
Next we describe existing work related to multilateral negotiations, and finally we explain our
intuition about the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations.
Consider a setting in which T risk-neutral sellers producing homogeneous products compete
to fulfill a contract for a single risk-neutral buyer. VB is the buyer's commonly known value of
having the contract fulfilled. Each seller's cost c is a privately known independent draw from the
continuous distribution function G with density g that is strictly positive over the support [c, -c].
In the auction literature, this is referred to as a symmetric independent private value (IPV) setting.
The first-price auction proceeds with each seller simultaneously submitting a secret price
offer. The seller offering the lowest price is awarded the contract at its offered price, provided that
price is less than VB. All other sellers receive nothing. If a sale is made, then the winning seller's
profit is p - c, where p is the transaction price and cw is the winning seller's cost. The buyer's
profit is VB - p, total surplus is VB - c, and efficiency is (VB - c.)/(VB - el), where cl is the
lowest realized cost.
The multilateral negotiation proceeds with each seller simultaneously submitting a secret
price offer. The buyer can accept one of the offers or reject them all. If the buyer accepts an offer,
then the game concludes and the transaction price is the price p offered by the winning seller.
As in the auction setting, the winning seller's profit is p - c, where c" is the winning seller's
cost, and the buyer's profit is VB - p. If the buyer rejects all offers, then the buyer can announce
to each seller a (possibly different and not necessarily true) competing offer that is better than
the seller's standing offer. The sellers can respond to these communications by making additional
secret price offers, the buyer can accept or reject these new offers, and so on. The game continues
in this fashion until a transaction occurs.
Although we are not aware of any formal models of multilateral negotiations, there is research
that examines related exchange mechanisms. One approach incorporates multiple sellers into a
bilateral bargaining framework. For example, Shaked and Sutton (1984) model an alternating
offer setting in which the buyer can switch to a different seller at some commonly known cost.
The buyer can bargain with only one seller at a time, and offers from one seller are void upon the
buyer's switching to the other seller. Assuming that both sellers are commonly known to have the
same cost, the authors find that the second seller's presence creates a credible threat that permits
the buyer to obtain more surplus than if switching were impossible.3 Our approach differs from
Shaked and Sutton (1984) in that we do not assume that the sellers' costs are common knowledge.
We also relax their alternating offer structure. In our setting, we envision the buyer not proposing
a price at which he is willing to buy, but instead obtaining price concessions by presenting a
seller with claims about the discounts offered by rival sellers. Moreover, multilateral negotiations
permit the buyer to hold multiple offers simultaneously, a feature distinct from the alternating
offer setting.
Another approach incorporates dynamic aspects of a buyer's ability to decline all offers in
a procurement auction. For example, McAfee and Vincent (1997) model a buyer's selection of
a reserve price, when the buyer cannot commit not to solicit offers in the future if he declines
all offers made today. Our approach differs from McAfee and Vincent (1997) in that we do not
assume that offers are made public. More important, we do not assume that the buyer commits
to an announced reserve price. While the buyer in a multilateral negotiation probably uses a
"reservation offer" to decide whether to accept an offer, the reservation offer may be based on the
entire set of received offers. This decision structure lets the buyer use current offers to forecast
future ones.
It has been hypothesized that the negotiations we describe are related to second-price or
English auctions (see Waehrer and Perry, 1999). The argument is that the buyer should be able
to obtain concessions from a seller until the seller's offer is just equal to his cost. While we
3 Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1987) examine an alternative model in which the buyers' values are private
information and the seller makes all of the offers.
( RAND 2002.
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agree partly with this characterization, our intuition is that the relationship between multilateral
negotiations and various auction formats depends critically on the buyer's ability to credibly
reveal to a seller his rivals' offers. In particular, if the offers cannot be credibly revealed, then the
multilateral negotiation should be similar to a first-price auction.4 When the buyer tries to use a
rival's offer to elicit a better offer from the seller, the seller must be concerned that the buyer is not
being truthful about the terms or existence of the rival's offer. Consequently, the seller must be
aware that he could end up bidding against himself by offering price reductions that are undercut
by fictitious discounts from a rival.
Just as in multilateral negotiations, in many auction settings a seller must be concerned
about bidding against himself. For example, consider a variant of the "button auction" described
by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in which the contract price starts at a high level, each potential
seller depresses a button to signal its willingness to fulfill the contract at the current price, and
the price decreases in continuous fashion. A seller signals its lowest offer by releasing its button
at that price. A firm cannot depress its button after releasing it, so a firm cannot exit and then
re-enter the bidding. The winning firm is the last to release its button, and it is paid the price at
which it released its button.
Suppose that sellers do not see the identity or price of firms that drop out, so they do not
know if other firms are currently participating.5 A seller must be concerned that it is continuing to
depress its button after all other sellers have dropped out. The informational structure suggests that
the outcome of this game should be related to the outcome of a multilateral negotiation without
credible revelation. However, this game is strategically equivalent to a Dutch clock procurement
auction, in which the price starts at zero and increases in continuous fashion, and the winner is
the first firm to depress its button. Moreover, the Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to a
sealed-bid first-price auction. Thus, from a theoretical perspective there should exist a relationship
between first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations in which rival sellers' offers are not
verifiable.
The preceding relationship may not be exact for several reasons. First, Coppinger, Smith,
and Titus (1980) and Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) report that in buying auctions, prices are
higher in first-price auctions than in Dutch clock auctions in which the price clock starts at a
high level. Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983) conclude that the real-time nature of the Dutch clock
auction matters because as the clock ticks down, bidders mistakenly lower their expectations of
their rivals' values. If nonverifiable multilateral negotiations are isomorphic to Dutch auctions,
then in a procurement auction we might expect multilateral negotiation prices to exceed first-price
auction prices.
Second, the outcomes of multilateral negotiations most likely depend on the players' ability
to haggle. For example, suppose that one seller has a low-cost draw relative to his rivals, and that
all the sellers begin with high offers that they reduce in the course of the negotiations. When the
high-cost rivals stop offering discounts, the low-cost seller may do the same if the buyer fails to
report (i.e., does not lie about) further competing discounts from the other sellers. The buyer may
not lie about competing offers if he fears the long-term consequences of purchasing from a seller
who refused to lower his price in the face of an alleged offer made by a rival. Thus, negotiated
prices may exceed one-shot first-price auction prices. However, a skilled buyer may be able to
keep a seller offering discounts below his equilibrium first-price auction offer, because an ex post
losing seller in a first-price auction would lower his price offer to win the contract. Hence, the
buyer might be able to extract more favorable offers in a multilateral negotiation.
Third, the outcomes may differ because in multilateral negotiations sellers must have incentives to make serious offers. That is, there is no reason for sellers to make an offer until the last
possible moment, particularly if there are no delay costs and if they think that serious initial offers
4 If the offers can be credibly revealed, then the multilateral negotiation should be similar to a second-price or
English auction, because sellers should be willing to make concessions until the price reaches their cost.
5 If sellers see when their rivals drop out, then the auction is equivalent to the version of the button auction

describedby Milgromand Weberin which the last active seller wins and is paid the price at which its final rival exits.
(C RAND 2002.
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will be used against them later in the negotiation.6 This effect would tend to make negotiated
prices exceed first-price auction prices. In our experimental framework there is a time limit on
each negotiation period, and the buyer cannot receive infinitely many offers. Consequently, a
seller might be concerned that he will be left out of the communication process if he does not
make serious offers. Moreover, if the seller does not stay current with the state of play, then even
if he tries to come in late in the negotiations he will not have a good sense of what the market
price is. These market frictions would tend to reduce negotiated prices, but not necessarily below
the level of first-price auction prices.

3. Experimental design and procedures
*
Because there are no models of multilateral negotiations, we conducted a heuristic experiment (see Smith, 1982) to compare first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations. We focus
on the case without credible revelation of rivals' offers because it seems to be-more empirically
relevant. Moreover, the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations seems less
likely to be exact in this setting than with credible revelation of offers.
Using "F" to denote a sequence of first-price auctions and "N" to denote a sequence of
multilateral negotiations, we pair two treatments, one with the pattern NFFN of sequences and
one with the pattern FFNF of sequences.7 The first and third sequences consist of 12 transactions,
the second consists of 16, and the fourth consists of 6.8 We vary these two treatments by changing
the number of sellers. One has two sellers per buyer, while the other has four sellers per buyer.
For each of the four treatments, {2 sellers, 4 sellers } x {NFFN, FFNF}, we have four groups
of subjects. Each subject is assigned a specific role in a specific group for the duration of the
session. A seller's characteristics consist of 46 random cost draws from the uniform distribution
on the support [0, 6.00], one for each period of play. Of the eight groups with four sellers, seller i
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) has the same cost draws across groups. Of the eight groups with two sellers, seller
i (i = 1, 2) has the same cost draws across groups. Moreover, the costs of sellers 1 and 2 in the
two-seller treatment are the same as the costs of sellers 1 and 2 in the four-seller treatment.
Our experiment consists of a total of 736 first-price auctions or rounds of multilateral negotiation using 64 undergraduate student volunteers (48 sellers and 16 buyers). Some students had
participated previously in market experiments, but with different trading institutions. No subject
participated in more than one of the sessions reported in this experiment.
In addition to reading self-paced instructions displayed by the software, the subjects followed
along as the experiment monitor read aloud from a handout with both additional and review
information.9 The public instructions explained (and made common knowledge) that the sellers'
costs were assigned randomly each period and that the distribution of the draws was U[0, 6.00].
The instructions also revealed that the buyer's value was 6.00. Revealing the buyer's value is
consistent with prior experiments that use buying auctions in which bids are constrained to be
nonnegative, which informs the subjects that bids below zero have no chance of being accepted.
The random cost draw for a given period was disclosed to the subject at the beginning of the
period. In the first-price auction environment, after learning his cost each seller had a maximum of
four minutes to submit his private offer to sell, though this limit was never binding. The computer
automatically awarded the contract to the seller who submitted the lowest offer once all the offers
had been submitted, provided that the lowest offer was less than 6.00. At the end of the auction,
6 Multilateralnegotiationwill be equivalentto a first-priceauctionif the buyer'scost of obtainingadditionaloffers
exceeds the maximumpossible gain fromobtainingthose offers, or if the discountfactoris zero (so thatfuturetransactions
have no value). In both cases the buyerwill accept one of the initial offers.
7 Ourinitialintentwas to use the morestandardFNF andNFN sequencesof treatments.However,ourpilot session
indicatedthat the NFN treatmentwould have takentoo much time for the numberof pairedauctionswe initially wished
to conduct.
8 Six trailingperiods of negotiationwere the most that could be comfortablyrun within a two-hourexperiment.
9 The instructionsfor the first-priceauctionare based upon those used by Cox, Roberson,and Smith (1982) and
Cox, Smith, and Walker(1983, 1988). The instructionsfor the multilateralnegotiationare newly developed.
( RAND 2002.
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the final market price was announced electronically to all market participants, after which the
session proceeded to the next period.
In the multilateral negotiation environment, after learning his cost each seller had a maximum
of 30 seconds in the first phase of the period to submit his initial offer to the buyer. The instructions
indicated that the seller would be able to lower his offer at any time in the second phase of the
period. Once the buyer received all initial offers, the clock was reset to four minutes for the
negotiation phase. At any time during the negotiation phase, a seller could (only) lower his
offer, and the buyer could accept the offer of a single seller. Furthermore, a buyer and a specific
seller could use text messaging over the computer network to engage in nonbinding discussions
concerning a deal. The sellers could communicate only with their buyer. However, the buyer
could negotiate individually with any seller, but only one at a time, while retaining standing offers
from the other sellers. This process is meant to parallel the process of a buyer soliciting RFPs
and then negotiating in person, over the phone, or online until a transaction price is agreed upon.
A transcript of the discussions between the buyer and the seller remained on the screen for the
duration of the period. The subjects only knew the laboratory identification numbers of the parties
with whom they were communicating. Once the buyer accepted an offer, the final market price
was announced electronically to all market participants,10 after which the session proceeded to
the next period. Each seller had no information on the initial offers or the subsequent discounts
made by the other sellers, unless the buyer revealed it in their discussions. However, the sellers
could not verify this information.
The subjects were not told the number of trading periods in the session or in any institutional
regime within the session. Moreover, the subjects did not know the nature of any future trading
institution, as the instructions for an institution were displayed only prior to commencing trade.
It was public information that the same set of sellers was matched with the same buyer for the
experiment's duration. Such repeated auction play is a common feature of naturally occurring
markets and the previous auction experiments discussed above.
Participants received $5 for showing up on time, plus their salient earnings. In the fourseller sessions, the buyers' exchange rate was US$1 for 8 experimental dollars, and the sellers'
exchange rate was US$1 for .25 experimental dollars. In the two-seller sessions, the exchange
amounts were 6 and 2 experimental dollars for each US$1, respectively.11 To equalize all subjects'
earnings expectations, the exchange rates are more favorable to the sellers because a buyer receives
a payoff every period, but a seller only expects to win every two or four periods, depending on the
number of sellers in the treatment. The average subject's earnings (in addition to the $5 show-up
fee) for the experiment were $17.12. The FFNF four-seller sessions and all two-seller sessions
lasted one hour on average, while the NFFN four-seller sessions lasted almost two hours.

4. Experimental results,
*
For each period of play, our data include the institution used, the transaction price, each
seller's cost, the buyer's value, and each seller's initial and subsequent offers in the multilateral
negotiations. We also have a verbatim record of the communications between buyers and sellers.
While not used in the statistical analysis, the transcripts provide insights about the players'
strategies and their beliefs about their rivals' strategies.
We summarize our results in a series of four findings. In addition to the qualitative results
displayed in tables and figures, we analyze the data using a linear mixed-effects model for repeated
measures. 12The results from estimating this model by the four regimes of 46 periods are reported
in Table 2 below. The dependent variable is the observed market price. The treatment effects (Two
10 There were two cases in which the buyer did not accept any offer, both in the two-seller treatment.
11 The subjects in the two-seller and four-seller treatments were given different exchange rates imputed from the
US$ payoffs of subjects in the IPV first-price auction experiments of Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982). Given their
outcomes, we tried to increase the saliency of the four-seller treatment by lowering the exchange rate further.
12

See Laird and Ware (1982) and Longford (1993) for a description of this technique.

( RAND 2002.
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versus Four sellers, and Negotiation versus First-Price Auction) and an interaction effect from
the 2 x 2 design are modelled as (zero-one) fixed effects, whereas the 16 independent sessions
are modelled as random effects, ei. To control for the across-period cost variation, we include the
deviations of the lowest and second-lowest costs from their theoretical expected values, and the
interactions of those deviations with the treatment variables. The expected values of the lowest
and second-lowest costs are 2 and 4 in the two-seller treatment, and 1.2 and 2.4 in the four-seller
treatment. Evaluating the costs' deviations from their mean values, denoted clij and C2ij, rather
than their levels, permits us to capture each treatment's expected price solely in the treatment
coefficient. Specifically, we estimate the model

Pi Twoi + P2Negotiationi + Pf3Twoi x Negotiationi
+ P4CIij + P5Clij x Twoi + P6Clij x Negotiationi + P7Clij x Twoi x Negotiationi

Priceij = /,t + ei +

+ fi8C2ij + fi9C2ij x Twoi + fIioC2ij X Negotiationi

+ PI lc2ij

x Twoi x Negotiationi

+ 8ij,

where the sessions are indexed by i and the periods by j (e.g., j = 1, 2, ..., 12, for the first
regime of twelve periods).13 We accommodate heteroskedastic errors by session when estimating
the model via maximum likelihood.
We first assess the effect of changing the number of sellers within a specific institution.
This baseline result establishes that changing the number of sellers affects transaction prices in a
manner consistent with the predictions of standard oligopoly models.
Finding 1. For all regimes, the primary effect of reducing the number of sellers from four to two
significantly increases transaction prices.
Evidence. Table 1 reports the average transaction price for the first 12 periods, by institutional
regime and number of sellers. The average price in the first-price auctions is 1.87 with four sellers
and 3.10 with two sellers, a 66% increase. This percentage increase nearly matches the predicted
theoretical increase of 65%, though the transaction prices are much lower than the predicted
theoretical levels also reported in Table 1. The average price in the multilateral negotiations is
1.88 with four sellers and 3.69 with two sellers, a 97% increase. Similar price comparisons can
be made for the remaining periods.
To formally test these conclusions, we refer to the estimates in Table 2. The coefficient on the
Two dummy variable measures the primary effect of the two-seller treatment. It is significant in
all four regimes, raising transaction prices by Pi = 1.03, 1.24, 2.32, and .99 experimental dollars,
respectively.

Q.E.D.

We now compare the transaction prices and the efficiency of first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations in the initial institutional regime, when subjects have no prior experience with
either institution.
Finding 2a. In Regime 1, multilateral negotiation prices and first-price auction prices are statistically indistinguishable with four sellers. However, multilateral negotiation prices are significantly
higher than first-price auction prices with two sellers.
Evidence. The average prices for the first 12 periods are reported in Table 1. With four sellers, the
average price is 1.87 in the first-price auctions and 1.88 in the multilateral negotiations. With two
sellers, the average price is 3.10 in the first-price auctions and 3.69 in the multilateral negotiations.
The estimate of the Negotiation coefficient (p2) in Table 2 represents the amount by which
the negotiation treatment changes transaction prices relative to first-price auctions, holding the
number of sellers constant at four. The point estimate is nearly zero and is insignificant (p-value
13 The linear mixed-effects model for
repeated measures treats each session as one degree of freedom with respect
to the treatments. Hence, with four parameters, there are 12 degrees of freedom for the estimates of the treatment fixed
effects (16 sessions-4 parameters).
(C RAND 2002.
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Average Transaction and Predicted Nash
Prices by Regime
Two Sellers

Sequence

I

Four Sellers

Observed

Nash
Prediction

Observed

Nash
Prediction

3.10
3.01
3.22
3.01

4.12
4.01
4.11
4.07

1.87
2.01
1.69
1.60

2.49
2.79
2.43
2.31

3.69
4.01
4.07
3.52

4.12
4.01
4.11
4.07

1.88
2.12
1.74
1.54

2.49
2.79
2.43
2.31

FFNF
Periods 1-12: F
Periods 13-28: F
Periods29-40: N
Periods41-46: F
NFFN
Periods 1-12: N
Periods 13-28: F
Periods 29-40: F
Periods41-46: N

Note: The predictedNash prices are conditionalon the draws and the assumption
of risk-neutralprice-setting.The ex ante Nash predictionsare 4.00 with two sellers
and 2.40 with four sellers.

= .8708). However, for two sellers the negotiation treatment significantly raises transaction prices
by P2 + P3 = .99 experimental dollars above the level in first-price auctions (p-value = .0004).

Finding 2b. In Regime 1, the primary effect of changing the number of sellers does not significantly
change the level of efficiency. The primary effect of changing from auctions to multilateral
negotiations slightly increases the level of efficiency. However, with two sellers, the total effect
of changing from auctions to multilateral negotiations does not significantly change the level of
efficiency.
Evidence. Table 3 reports the average efficiency for the first 12 periods, by institutional regime and
number of sellers. The high efficiency levels are consistent with those reported in previous auction
experiments.14 Table 4 reports the results from a linear mixed-effects model for the efficiency
levels, for which the baseline treatment is four sellers in first-price auctions. We do not control for
across-period cost variation like we did in the pricing analysis, because cost variation theoretically
should not influence efficiency. In the auction treatment, reducing the number of sellers from four
to two has no effect on efficiency (?1 = 1.57, p-value = .2154). With four sellers the negotiation
treatment significantly raises efficiency levels by ?2 = 2.98 percentage points (p-value = .0134).
However, with two sellers the Negotiation primary effect is offset by the Two x Negotiation
interaction effect (?2 + Y3 = -.39, p-value = .6539).
Findings 2a and 2b report that transaction prices with two sellers are higher in multilateral
negotiations than in first-price auctions, but that efficiency is the same. We infer that the trading
rules affect the transfer of surplus from the buyer to the more efficient of the two sellers. With
four sellers, transaction prices are the same across institutions, but the level of efficiency increases
slightly when using multilateral negotiations (3 percentage points).
One explanation for the price differential is that multilateral negotiations may foster tacit
collusion. However, this explanation is weak because (a) there is no evidence of bid rotation, (b)
the negotiation transcripts indicate that the sellers are concerned about how competitive their offers
are, and (c) efficiency is high. McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that collusion without side
payments in first-price auctions requires inefficient allocation of contracts. It seems reasonable
14 For example, see

Cox, Roberson,and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith, and Walker(1983).
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TABLE 2

Estimates of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Price'

Estimate

Standard

Degrees of

Error

Freedom

p-value

Estimate

Regime 1: Periods 1-12

Two

Standard

Degrees of

Error

Freedom

p-value

Regime 2: Periods 13-28

1.75

.13

166

.0000

1.53

.12

232

1.03

.20

12

.0001*

1.24

.17

12

.0000*

.0000

Negotiation'

.03

.19

12

.8708

.13

.17

12

.4354

Two x Negotiation

.96

.28

12

.0047

1.10

.24

12

.0007

Cl

.98

.16

166

.0000

.88

.03

232

.0000

.17

166

.1829

-.01

.05

232

.8760

.23

166

.6560

-.03

.06

232

.5966

-.54

.08

232

.0000

.03

232

.0150

cl x Two
cl x Negotiation

-.22
.10

cl x Two x Negotiation

-.63

.24

166

.0094

C2

-.04

.12

166

.7667

.13

166

.3089

-.06

.05

232

.3010

.17

166

.3609

-.04

.06

232

.5061

.19

166

.5780

.08

232

.8977

C2

X Two

C2

x Negotiation

C2

x Two x Negotiation

.13
-.16
.10

Number of observations

.08

.01

190

256

P2 + P3 i/

Ha:

P2 + P3 > 0

.0004

.0000

Regime 4: Periods 41-46

Regime 3: Periods 29-40
IL

1.71

.13

168

.0000

1.66

.03

72

.0000

Two

2.32

.19

12

.0000*

.99

.09

12

.0000*

-.05

.18

12

.8088

.10

.07

12

.1404

-1.27

.28

12

.0007

1.01

.11

12

.0000

.04

168

.0000

.78

.04

72

.0000

.06

168

.0000

-.08

.08

72

.3579

168

.9397

-.12

.08

72

.1603

Negotiation
Two x Negotiation

.91

Cl
cl x Two

-.50

cl x Negotiation

.00

.05

cl x Two x Negotiation

.43

.09

168

.0000

-.49

.12

72

.0001

C2

.00

.04

168

.9750

-.10

.04

72

.0231
.1744

C2

X Two

-.03

.07

168

.6879

.11

.08

72

C2

x Negotiation

-.02

.05

168

.6679

.18

.10

72

.0705

C2

X Two x Negotiation

.10

168

.7064

.12

72

.3388

.04

Number of observations
Ha:

-.12

192
P2 + P3 i0

96
.0000

P2 + P3 > 0

.0000

Note: For brevity, the session random effects are not included in the table.
= /it + ej + Pi Twoj + f2Negotiationj + P3Twoi x Negotiationi + f4Clij + P5Clij X Twoj + f6CIij x Negotiationi + f7Clij x
ayriceij
N(0, 12)and
Twoj x Negotiationi + P8lc2ij + P9lC2ij x Twoj + P IC2ij X Negotiationi + All C2ij x Twoi x Negotiationi + sij, where eEij - N(0, o2.).
*
**

One-sided test.
For Regime 2, Negotiation is a dummy variable denoting a history of multilateral negotiations in the previous regime.

that collusion in multilateral negotiations also requires inefficiency. Therefore, because the two
institutions are equally efficient, it is unlikely that the higher transaction prices in the multilateral
negotiations can be attributed to collusion.
In Section 2 we claimed that auctions and negotiations might differ because the buyer may
be unable to keep low-cost sellers offering additional discounts in those instances in which rival
sellers have high costs. Figure 1 illustrates how behavior consistent with that hypothesis influences
the difference in the transaction prices of first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations with two
sellers. When the lowest cost is high (in which case the gap between the lowest and second-lowest
cost is likely to be small), negotiated prices and first-price auction prices are similar. When the
lowest cost is low (in which case the gap between the lowest and second-lowest cost is likely to
be large), negotiated prices exceed first-price auction prices. With four sellers this result does not
? RAND 2002.
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TABLE 3

Sequence

Two Sellers
(%)

FourSellers
(%)

96.4
99.5
97.1
98.3

96.0
98.8
96.8
98.6

94.3*
96.1
92.5
97.6

96.8
98.7
98.9
98.6

FFNF
Periods 1-12: F
Periods 13-28: F
Periods29-40: N
Periods41-46: F

NFFN
Periods 1-12: N
Periods 13-28: F
Periods29-40: F
Periods41-46: N

Note:Efficiencyis definedto be 100%x (6-winner's cost)/(6lowest cost draw).
*This average includes two observationsfor which the buyer
rejected both final offers and purchased nothing in those
periods, resulting in 0% efficiency. The statistical tests in
Finding2b include these two observations.Excluding these two
observations,the averageefficiency is 98.5%.

TABLE 4

Estimates of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Efficiencya

Estimate

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

1.03
1.20
1.03
1.58

176
12
12
12

.0000
.2154
.0134
.0552

.53
.53
.65
1.38

240
12
12
12

.0000
.0342
.4201
.0010

.002
1.51
.44
1.57

176
12
12
12

.0000
.0003
.0056
.0001

Standard
Error

Regime 1: Periods 1-12
Au
Two
Negotiation
Two x Negotiation
Numberof observations

97.02
1.57
2.98
-3.36
192

Regime 2: Periods 13-28
Au
Two
NegotiationHistory
Two x NegotiationHistory
Numberof observations

98.74
1.26
.55
-5.95
256

Regime 3: Periods 29-40
Au
Two
Negotiation
Two x Negotiation
Numberof observations

99.99
-7.64
-1.47
9.10
192

Note: There is insufficientvariationin the level of efficiency across and within treatmentsto estimate
the model for Regime 4.
aEfficiencyij= it + ei + YiTwoi+ y2Negotiationi+ y3Twoi x Negotiationi+ 8ij, where ei - N(0, a 2)
and sij
N(0, o2).
? RAND 2002.
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FIGURE 1
AVERAGE PERIOD PRICES VERSUS MINIMUMCOST IN REGIME 1
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emerge,plausibly because the differencebetween the lowest and second-lowest costs is smaller
thanwhen there are only two sellers.
Ourthirdfindingillustrateshow tradingsequenceaffects marketperformance.We reportthis
findingin three parts,the first of which comparesthe common 16 periods of first-priceauctions
in periods 13 through28. The second partcomparesthe behaviorfor periods 29 through40, and
the thirdpartassesses the returnto the originalinstitutionin periods 41 through46, just priorto
which all subjectshave equal experiencewith the institutions.
Finding 3a. In Regime 2, first-priceauction prices are significantlyhigher for the sellers in the
NFFN treatmentthanfor the sellers in the FFNF treatment,with two sellers. Thereis no acrosstreatmentdifferencein transactionprices with four sellers.
Evidence. Table 1 reports the average prices for periods 13 through28. With two sellers, the
averageprice is 3.01 for those sellers in the FFNF treatmentand 4.01 for those sellers in the
NFFN treatment, a 33% increase. With four sellers, there is only a 5% increase.
? RAND 2002.
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The alternative to the null hypothesis that the transaction prices are identical is that prices may
be higher for those who negotiated initially. This difference could be an experience effect caused
by first participating in multilateral negotiations, or it could be because the subjects randomly
assigned to the NFFN two-seller treatment tend to set higher prices.15 We employ a one-sided
test for the two-seller treatment because we have already observed that negotiated prices are
higher than first-price auction prices in the initial 12 periods, but we employ a two-sided test for
the four-seller treatment. Referring to Table 2, with two sellers the first-price auction prices are
P2 + ,83 = 1.23 experimental dollars higher in the NFFN treatment than in the FFNF treatment
(p-value = .0000). However, with four sellers we find no across-treatment difference in transaction
prices (82 = .13, p-value = .4354).
Q.E.D.
Finding 3b. In Regime 3, first-price auction prices in the NFFN treatment exceed negotiated prices
in the FFNF treatment, with two sellers. There is no across-institution difference in transaction
prices with four sellers.
Evidence. Table 1 reports the average prices for periods 29 through 40. With two sellers, the
average multilateral negotiation price is 3.22 for those sellers in the FFNF treatment, and the
average first-price auction price is 4.07 for those sellers in the NFFN treatment. With four sellers,
the average prices are 1.69 and 1.74.
We have no clear prediction of how prices might differ across the two institutions, so we
employ a two-sided test for equivalence of transaction prices. Referring to Table 2, for two sellers
first-price auction prices are - (A +33) = 1.32 experimental dollars above the prices for two sellers
in multilateral negotiations (p-value = .0000). However, for four sellers we find no difference in
transaction prices (P2 = -.05, p-value = .8088).
Q.E.D.
Finding 3c. In Regime 4, the original ranking of the institutions' transaction prices returns when the
subjects return to their original institution. That is, multilateral negotiation prices are statistically
indistinguishable from first-price auction prices with four sellers, but multilateral negotiation
prices are significantly higher than first-price auction prices with two sellers.
Evidence. Table 1 reports the average prices for the final six periods. With four sellers, the average
price is 1.60 in the first-price auctions and 1.54 in the multilateral negotiations. With two sellers,
the average price is 3.01 in the first-price auctions and 3.52 in the multilateral negotiations.
At the start of period 41, each subject has experience with 12 multilateral negotiations and
28 first-price auctions, though in a different order. We employ a one-sided test for the two-seller
treatment because negotiated prices were statistically higher than first-price auction prices in the
initial 12 periods, but we employ a two-sided test for the four-seller treatment. Referring to Table
2, for two sellers the negotiation treatment significantly raises transaction prices by P2 + /33 = 1.11
experimental dollars above the level in first-price auctions (p-value = .0000). However, for four
sellers we find no difference in transaction prices (,8 = .10, p-value = .1404).
Q.E.D.
The three parts of Finding 3 indicate that with two sellers there is an across-treatment
difference that affects transaction prices throughout the experiment. We infer that initial exposure
to multilateral negotiations leads to higher prices throughout the session than does initial exposure
to first-price auctions. One explanation for this result is that the nature of the competition induced
by the initial institution may permanently affect how sellers formulate their bidding/negotiating
strategies. For example, the competition induced by the one binding offer of the first-price auction
may overwhelm the opportunity for the sellers later to keep prices higher with multilateral
negotiations. We also admit the possibility that the subjects randomly assigned to the NFFN
and FFNF two-seller treatments may differ in their propensity to set high prices. Regardless of
the reason, the sequence effect in the two-seller treatment has a nontrivial effect on the subjects'
earnings. Sellers first exposed to two-seller multilateral negotiations earn on average US$7.82 (or
15 We thanka refereefor

pointing out this alternativehypothesis.

? RAND 2002.
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85%) more than their counterparts first exposed to first-price auctions. This difference comes at
a cost to the buyers, who earn US$6 less when first exposed to multilateral negotiations.
Our final examination of across-treatment differences tests our hypothesis that multilateral
negotiations without credible revelation of rivals' offers should look more like first-price auctions
than second-price or English auctions.16 While we do not have experimental data for secondprice or English auctions, we generate simulated English auction data by appealing to Coppinger,
Smith, and Titus (1980) and Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987), who showed that bidders follow
their dominant strategies in English auctions. Therefore, the simulated English auction price is
the second-lowest cost.
Finding 4. With both two and four sellers, multilateral negotiation prices are not explained by the
second-lowest cost, but they are explained by the lowest cost. Hence, multilateral negotiations
without credible revelation of rivals' offers more closely resemble first-price auctions than English
auctions.
Evidence. Table 2 reports by regime the influence of the lowest and second-lowest costs on both
negotiated prices and first-price auction prices. We focus on Regimes 1, 3, and 4, for which
there are paired first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations. In each regime, the lowest
cost significantly influences the market price in both institutions directly through the cl term
(34 = .98, .91, .78, Regimes 1, 3, and 4, respectively). Of the cost interaction coefficients, only
the cl x Two x Negotiation coefficient is consistently significant (p-values = .0094, .0000, and
.0001) and roughly half the magnitude of the cl and Two x Negotiation coefficients. In contrast,
the second-lowest cost has no influence on negotiated prices, except marginally in Regime 4.
Q.E.D.
Finally, we comment on the within-subject effects of the multilateral negotiation and firstprice auction institutions. We focus on the two-seller treatment because Findings 2 and 3 indicate
that the four-seller treatment yields very similar pricing and efficiency levels across institutions.
In our working paper, Thomas and Wilson (2000), we report that winning multilateral negotiation
prices are not greater than the confidence and prediction intervals of the seller's first-price offer
function for either the NFFN or FFNF sessions. Thus, there appears to be no across-institution
difference at the subject level. In addition, the first-price offer function at low-cost draws is closer
to the risk-neutral prediction in the NFFN sessions than in the FFNF sessions. One explanation
for the latter finding is that the subjects' institutional experience influences their risk preferences
in the first-price auctions.17 An alternative explanation is that initial exposure to an institution
affects the subjects' formulation of their strategies in both institutions. This is similar to the
model proposed in Crawford and Broseta (1998) to explain how whether or not subjects were
exposed to one institution affects how they behave in a second. These within-subject conclusions,
however, must be tempered by the observation that these experience effects cannot necessarily be
disentangled from session effects.

5. Conclusion
*
In this article we study a common exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations,"
in which a buyer plays sellers off one another to obtain concessions on their initial price offers.
Using experimental techniques, we evaluate subject behavior in multilateral negotiations without
credible revelation of rivals' offers, and we compare the outcomes of multilateral negotiations
and first-price auctions.
When subjects have no experience with either institution, we find that transaction prices
are statistically higher in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions with two sellers,
but that the institutions are equally efficient. We also find that prices are indistinguishable in the
16 We thanka refereefor suggesting this analysis.
17 See

Berg, Dickhaut,and McCabe (1996) for an experimentthat finds that individuals'risk preferencesare not
stable across institutions.
? RAND 2002.
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two institutionswith four sellers, but that multilateralnegotiations are slightly more efficient.
Moreover,with four sellers we cannotdistinguishbetweenthe two institutions'transactionprices
at any point in the experiment,which suggests that the institutionsare outcome-equivalentwith
four sellers. Finally, we find that nonverifiablemultilateralnegotiationsmore closely resemble
first-priceauctionsthanEnglish auctions.
Ourresultshave implicationsfor institutionaldesign and for antitrustanalysis.First,buyers
in our setting should prefer to employ first-priceauctions ratherthan multilateralnegotiations,
assumingthatmultilateralnegotiationsaremore costly in termsof the time spentdeterminingthe
transactionprice. Second, cautionshouldbe used in applyingauctionmodels in mergeranalyses
in which transactionsmore closely resemble multilateralnegotiations.Not only do we find that
the price level can differ substantiallyacross the institutionsfor certainnumbersof sellers, but
the percentageprice change associatedwith changingthe numberof sellers also can differ.
The implications of our results are limited by the scope of our experiment and would
benefit from furtherresearch.First, it would be useful to extend our analysis to settings with
differentnumbersof sellers. At this point, we do not know for what numberof sellers multilateral
negotiationsandfirst-priceauctionsbecome indistinguishable,or whetherthe price-concentration
relationshipis actuallylinear.Second, from the perspectiveof mergerpolicy, it would be useful
to extend our analysis to settings with changes both in the numberof sellers and in the sellers'
postmergercost distributions.To date, these issues have not been explored fully in the auction
setting, and clearly not in our multilateralnegotiationsetting. Finally, it would be interestingto
let the buyerselect his preferredinstitution,or be unableto commit not to haggle upon receiving
the sellers' initial offers.
Appendix
*
The following selections are taken from the real-time ordered transcript for the four two-seller NFFN discussions
(bold added for emphasis).
Session 1, period 11 (Seller l's cost is .20 with an initial offer of 3.50. Seller 2's cost is .41 with an initial offer of 4.15).
[Buyer to Seller 1]: can you go down to 3.00?
[Seller 1]: yes
[Buyer to Seller 2]: they are lower onceagain....is it possible to go down quite a bit?
[Seller 1]: will that work best for you?
[Seller 2]: tell me a price? [Buyer to Seller 2]: what's the lowest you can possibly go?
[Seller 2]: Tell me there price
[Buyer to Seller 2]: can you beat 3.00?
[Seller 1]: if not I can sacrafice 2.94
[Buyer to Seller 2]: actually...they just went below that..can u go any lower?
[Seller 1]: do you have a better offer?
[Seller 2]: If we don't deal wuicker then we lose money. you arem aking money everytime so don't
barter so much
[Buyer to Seller 1]: woah...they just went down a lot...can you go any lower? you are both real close.
The buyer accepted Seller l's offer of 2.00.
Session 2, period ] (Seller l's cost is 1.23 with an initial offer of 5.00. Seller 2's cost is 2.81 with an initial offer of 7.50).
[Buyer to Seller 1]:
[Seller 1]: yes??
[Seller 2]: hi there
[Buyer to Seller 1]: seller 2 has offered me $3. Can you beat that?
[Seller 1]: 2.90
[Seller 2]: is my price too high?
[Seller 1]: so?
[Buyer to Seller 2]: seller 1 just offered me 2.50 can you beat that
[Seller 1]: i give u 2.90
[Seller 2]: ha, nope. I'd lose a ton of money!
[Seller 2]: maybe next time

[Buyer to Seller 1]: seller 2 just counteredwith 2.25, can you beat that
? RAND 2002.
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(Note: The buyeris lying. Seller 2 never lowered his initial offer of 7.50.)
[Seller 1]: ok??
The buyeracceptedSeller l's offer of 2.20.
Session 3, period 7 (Seller l's cost is 2.37 with an initial offer of 3.75. Seller 2's cost is 2.25 with an initial offer of 4.50).
[Seller 2]: give me an offer
[Buyerto Seller 2]: How about3.50
[Seller 2]: make it 4.00
[Seller 2]: how is that
[Buyer to Seller 2]: sorry
The buyeracceptedSeller l's offer of 3.75.
Session 4, period 11 (Seller l's cost is .20 with an initial offer of 5.75. Seller 2's cost is .41 with an initial offer of 3.82).
[Seller 1]: This is ridiculous...
[Seller 2]: This is a low price for ya
[Buyerto Seller 2]: sold at 2.75
[Buyerto Seller 1]: don't thinkyou can do this round
[Seller 1]: where you at
[Buyerto Seller 1]: goota show me 3.25
[Seller 2]: How's 3.50
[Seller 1]: I'll show 4
[Buyerto Seller 2]: 3.0 is a deal
[Buyerto Seller 1]: down to 3.2
[Seller 2]: 3.15?
[Buyerto Seller 1]: 3.0 sells
[Buyerto Seller 2]: gotta compete
[Buyerto Seller 2]: show me 3.0
[Seller 1]: where you at
[Buyerto Seller 1]: i'm at 2.8
[Seller 2]: it's only 5 cents
[Seller 1]: what happened to 3
[Buyerto Seller 2]: gotta beat 3.0 now
[Buyer to Seller 1]: competition
[Seller 2]: 2.98
[Seller 1]: competition, hahahahhaha
[Buyerto Seller 2]: show me 2.75 and i buy
[Buyerto Seller 1]: gotta beat 2.8
[Buyerto Seller 2]: gotta buy from the lowest bed
[Buyerto Seller 2]: beat 2.7
The buyer acceptedSeller 2's offer of 2.65.
Seller l's submittedoffers were: 5.75, 5.50, 4.00, 3.50, 3.29, 3.00, 2.80, and 2.75.
Seller 2's submittedoffers were: 3.82, 3.50, 3.25, 3.05, 2.98, 2.85, and 2.65.
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